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highlighted even more forcefully—runs against one familiar model of modern profes-
sionalization, whereby a commercializing economy and the growing prosperity of the
“middling ranks” naturally stimulate an established profession to become more bour-
geois in its orientation, meritocratic in its public convictions, and quick to exploit new
opportunities for practice and fees. Lemmings’s counterstory of the manner in which
the eighteenth-century bar wedded itself to the unreformed legal order, in service to a
smaller range of litigants, makes for a theme of scholarly interest well beyond the
particular professional history he has so skillfully and valuably charted here.
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This book well illustrates the benefits, and also the perils, of tackling a subject that
straddles several historiographical fields and periods. Aspiring to meet the “minimal
standards of each of three quite dissimilar disciplinary discourses” (p. xv)—general or
“mainstream” British history, legal history, and economic history—Ron Harris is
chronologically as well as conceptually ambitious. While the dates on his title page do
reflect the author’s prime focus, his earlier chapters delve further back, into the sixteenth
century and before. Such “span” (to use a favorite term of the late W. K. Hancock) can
and often does help historians see things afresh, even at the risk of getting some of
them wrong. Whether that risk is worth taking will always depend on the particular
case in question, as well as author’s and reader’s personal preferences.
Harris announces his “central theme” as “the relationship between legal and eco-
nomic developments in the context of England’s industrial revolution and, more spe-
cifically, in the context of business organization” (p. 2). Still more specifically, his
preoccupation is a variant of Max Weber’s famous claim that “England achieved cap-
italistic supremacy . . . not because but rather in spite of its judicial system” (Max
Weber on Law in Economy and Society, ed. E. Shils and M. Rheinstein [New York,
1967], p. 231). Between the passing of the Bubble Act in 1720 and Gladstone’s Com-
panies Act of 1844, the legal framework governing commercial and industrial enter-
prises was seemingly both restrictive and uncertain. Limited access to the privileges of
corporate personality (especially the right to sue and be sued) meant that “preindustrial”
modes of business organization—notably, partnerships and unincorporated joint stock
companies—remained the norm through and beyond the first phase of “industrial rev-
olution.”
How could this be so, and why was it that corporations, not partnerships or trusts,
eventually emerged as the preferred modern business form? These questions are of
some theoretical interest, having been answered hitherto in sharply divergent fashion.
Those scholars who emphasize the law’s autonomous development can only deplore
its deleterious and retrograde economic impact, at least in this particular instance. In
contrast, those who see law as the expression of socioeconomic conditions seek to
explain away the supposed dysfunctionality of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century
English company law as more apparent than real. Harris offers to navigate a course
between these two contending schools with “a pragmatic and dialectic approach” (p. 9)
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that depicts the law as responding both to internal jurisprudential logic and to multi-
farious external pressures, but in varying measure at different times: largely meeting
the needs of merchants and monarchs until the early eighteenth century, then being
somewhat detached and unresponsive for the next hundred years, and finally being
brought into much closer fit with a fast-expanding economy by a combination of par-
liamentary and judicial action.
However commendable in principle, the real test of interdisciplinarity is its practical
implementation. While this volume with its stress on the noncapitalist ethos of the
Hanoverian and early Victorian bar was written without the benefit of David Lem-
mings’s most recent and broadly corroborative findings (in Professors of the Law:
Barristers and English Legal Culture in the Eighteenth Century [Oxford, 2000]), in
general Harris handles both legal and economic strands effectively. For example, there
is an excellent chapter on the nature and impact of the 1720 Bubble Act (never hence-
forth to be placed after rather than before the collapse of the South Sea Bubble), and
there are well-documented discussions of subsequent attempts to establish joint stock
operations in flour milling, utilities, banking, fisheries, and other industries. Constraints
of space and the nature of the subject matter make it unsurprising that the exposition
sometimes seems excessively abstract and schematic, with primary sources occasion-
ally a little thin on the ground. This is especially marked in chapter 6, where attempts
to demonstrate the shortcomings of trusts, partnerships, and unincorporated companies
are undermined by lack of evidence about how such potential problems as lack of
continuity and unlimited personal liability were actually tackled. (At one point the
author even disarmingly admits that his evidence is “scant, and the argument, accord-
ingly, is rather speculative and based on theoretical postulations” (p. 157 n. 49).
Notwithstanding a commendable disregard for conventional scholarly periodization,
especially as between the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries, it may be that
Harris’s chronological limits are actually set too tight to do his subject justice. While
tracking the corporation back into the deep antiquity of English law and history would
have been a work of supererogation, the treatment of its pre-eighteenth-century history
is not entirely satisfactory. In particular, Harris exaggerates the predominantly mercan-
tile character of Tudor and Stuart joint stock business corporations, disregarding George
Unwin’s observation (in Industrial Organization in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Cen-
turies [Oxford, 1904]—a work absent from his bibliography) that “the earliest joint
stock experiments were as much concerned with industry as with commerce” (Unwin,
p. 152). Conversely, readers left with the impression that the 1844 Companies Act
marks the end of the story might be surprised to learn that in Alfred Marshall’s view
individual proprietorships or partnerships remained the basic British business unit for
most of the nineteenth century (cited in Law, Economy, and Society, 1750–1914: Es-
says in the History of English Law, ed. G. R. Rubin and D. Sugarman [Abingdon,
1984], p. 5).
The most difficult task facing a historian of law and economy is to integrate these
more specialized narratives with their general historical context. While Harris generally
copes well with this challenge, his viewpoint throughout remains that of an optimistic
late twentieth-century free marketeer. Accordingly, he sometimes fails to appreciate
the possible cogency and significance of other perspectives—such as hostility toward
corporations (for which, see Paul Langford, Public Life and the Propertied Englishman,
1689–1798 [Oxford, 1991], pp. 209–32)—in a society where “business” still largely
meant anything that one busied oneself about. Thus common-law prohibitions on food
market manipulation are dismissed as “antiquated” (p. 226), and Adam Smith’s en-
lightened views are contrasted with the belief that “speculation in shares, was by its
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nature, manipulative,” leading to “artificial market prices” (p. 227). In the wake of the
post-2000 stock market collapse and associated corporate scandals, perhaps such atti-




The Mighty Experiment: Free Labor versus Slavery in British Emancipation.
By Seymour Drescher.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. vi307. $50.00.
Seymour Drescher has enjoyed a long and distinguished career as a specialist of Eu-
ropean colonial slavery, the slave trade and abolitionism, and especially of the role
played by Great Britain in these processes. One of his most influential books, published
a quarter of a century ago, Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition (Pitts-
burgh, 1977), led the attack against the then prevailing thesis of Eric Williams, which
claimed that Britain had abolished the slave trade in 1807 primarily because of the
diminishing value of slavery and the West Indies for Great Britain. By demonstrating
that British public mobilization had obliged London to commit what Drescher termed
“econocide,” or an action detrimental to Britain’s own economic interests at a time
when the slave system was actually at the height of prosperity, Drescher’s work was
decisive in undermining the economic determinist interpretation of abolitionism that
had dominated historiography for over three decades following World War II. Drescher
and a host of other scholars argued convincingly in the latter third of the twentieth
century that humanitarianism, not economics, drove the nineteenth-century British ab-
olitionist movement, a point made by Drescher in a whole series of articles and a
subsequent book, Capitalism and Antislavery: British Abolitionism in Comparative
Perspective (New York, 1987). In a sense, then, the author’s most recent monograph,
The Mighty Experiment, builds on his earlier contributions. Its leading theme is that
economic theory—particularly, ideas of free labor—played only a minor role in the
abolitionist arsenal against slavery.
Drescher asserts that abolitionists and their opponents, inspired by the scientific and
experimental spirit of the Enlightenment, borrowed arguments selectively from the
emerging social sciences in an attempt to channel and control a potentially explosive
debate over the slavery system. After briefly examining the emerging scientific fields
of botany, biology, and epidemiology, he dismisses them as having had only marginal
impact on abolitionist and colonial discourse. More relevant, he admits, were the po-
litico-economic theories of Adam Smith—posited in the late eighteenth century—that
free labor was generally more productive than the coerced variety. At first, though, in
their battle against the slave trade, abolitionists tended to borrow concepts from popu-
lation science rather than economics in order to highlight the heavy mortality rates of
the slave traffic and the negative demographic effects of slavery in the colonies. Some
disciples of Smith did keep free-labor precepts alive in early nineteenth-century anti-
slavery circles, but Drescher affirms that even in the 1820s abolitionists employed them
much less than most historians assume. This was undoubtedly because many gradualist
abolitionists questioned the preparedness of slaves for productive lives under freedom,
while still others, such as James Stephen, wondered whether sugar could really be
effectively produced by freed blacks. Nevertheless, once the forces of British popular
